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Abstract 
Changes to the material and social systems that underpin energy infrastructures are inextricably 
linked to energy justice concerns, and the timeframes of those changes significantly affect their 
outcomes. Temporal aspects of energy initiatives and their impacts are thus an important site for 
examining emergent public views on new energy proposals, inequality, and energy justice. We 
propose urgency is a particularly rich concept through which to study (i) the justice and 
socioenvironmental implications of energy systems and technological change and (ii) how 
people make sense of contested energy timeframes. Here, we present findings from a series of 
public deliberation workshops held in the United States and United Kingdom to discuss 
projected impacts of shale oil and gas extraction by hydraulic fracturing. We encountered critical 
similarities across sites, as in widespread public resistance to issue framings that foreground 
urgency-based claims in support of their objectives. Participants assessed energy initiatives with 
particular reference to temporality and urgency, and we argue these views raise justice concerns 
regarding distribution, the creation of environmental inequalities, public participation, and 
recognition. We also suggest a focus on urgency provides fresh perspectives on justice issues 
surrounding the speed and direction of technological development in general and of energy 
transitions in particular.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Energy justice addresses inequalities in how energy is produced, distributed or consumed around 
the world. Developed as both an analytical and practical decision-making concept (Hall et al. 
2013, Sovacool and Dworkin 2015), energy justice builds on decades of environmental justice 
work addressing systemic marginalization, the uneven distribution of ills and benefits across 
societies, and disparities in the recognition of diverse voices within decision-making procedures 
(Bullard 1996, McCauley et al. 2013). A number of scholars have argued that changes made to 
energy infrastructures are inextricably linked to justice concerns, and the timeframes of those 
changes significantly affect their outcomes (Sovacool 2016). For example, recent analyses of 
energy transitions have assessed their capacity to create or exacerbate inequalities (Ottinger 
2013, Fouquet 2016), highlighting the effects of different speeds of transition, what the impacts 
are, who wins, and who loses (Sovacool and Geels 2016). Analyzing the temporality and relative 
speed of interventions in ongoing socio-historical processes also supports the study of 
environmental injustice as a dimension of those processes and not merely an outcome of isolated 
events (Pellow 2000). We propose urgency is a pivotal concept both in researching the justice 
and socioenvironmental implications of energy systems and technological change and in 
understanding how people make sense of contested energy timeframes. Here, we focus on public 
views on prospective shale oil and gas extraction in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 
Shale development is contested in both countries, as are urgency-based pleas made by 
governments and other actors in support of its rapid implementation and expansion. For some 
supporters, there is an urgent need to capitalize on shale extraction to potentially increase 
economic activity, reduce fuel prices, stabilize energy supplies, or to use gas from shale in 
energy generation as a ‘bridge fuel’ in the transition from high-carbon coal to alternative low-
carbon energy sources (Jacquet 2014, Stern and NRC 2014). Opponents of fracking highlight the 
urgency of preventing its negative impacts, including localized environmental and social costs 
and, globally, its contribution to climate change through growing fossil fuel production 
(Broderick et al. 2011). This paper draws on qualitative data from a series of deliberation 
workshops we held in the US and UK to discuss documented and projected impacts of shale oil 
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and gas extraction, its role as part of wider changes to energy systems, and conflicting claims 
made in popular and political discourse in support of or against different energy initiatives. 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Urgency, risk, and energy justice 
Prior deliberative work on nanotechnologies and geoengineering has found notions of urgency 
highlight important issues of risk, benefit, harm, and inequality (Pidgeon et al. 2009, Harthorn et 
al. 2012b). Urgency as a theme emerged when people discussed technological developments and 
their impacts as being located in an immediate temporal plane and when these impacts were 
considered to be pressing, acute, present, imperative, timely or similar. Urgency also appears 
when short-term concerns, needs and views are emphasized and/or prioritized over those that 
operate in the longer-term or are associated with precaution, increased regulation and ‘techno-
skepticism’ (Pidgeon et al. 2009). This happens, for example, when perceived urgency about 
short-term issues filters out or attenuates longer-term societal and environmental concerns.  
 
An analytical focus on urgency thus facilitates, among other topics, the study of tensions 
between views on different timeframes of energy initiatives and their impacts, as well as the 
effects of urgency in government and corporate rhetoric on those views. Notions of urgency 
often appear in the framing of energy initiatives, particularly with reference to increasing energy 
demand (Dirks et al. 2014). Urgency discourse and framing are also common in the world of 
emergent technologies, where market forces and the accelerated pace of innovation are said to 
create a ‘tyranny of urgency,’ creating challenges for regulators and often prompting calls for 
moratoria to slow down development (Lee and Petts 2013). Urgency as a concept is thus an 
important dimension of core concerns for risk research, science, technology and society (STS), 
and energy justice, and thus warrants further focused analysis.  
 
In findings from our previous deliberations on energy applications of nanotechnology in the US 
and UK, we note that perceived urgency of meeting current and projected future levels of energy 
demand was surprisingly strongly linked to public support for new nanotechnologies for energy 
applications, although this was somewhat tempered by competing concerns about energy 
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conservation and efficiency (Pidgeon et al. 2009). The case of nanotechnology energy thus 
produced an urgency-based risk attenuation effect, notable in contrast with nanotechnologies for 
health and therapy, about which publics in both countries were more risk sensitive or ambivalent 
over distributive justice issues (Pidgeon et al. 2009). This is unlike, for example, perceived risks 
and benefits of genetically modified foods in the UK, where ambivalence manifested as high 
perceived technological benefits working in concert with high perceived human health risks and 
lack of trust (Poortinga and Pidgeon 2005). The specific case of shale development presents a 
unique field for further examining interrelated issues of temporality, urgency, risk, and 
(in)justice since it is deeply implicated in overlapping local, national and global dimensions of 
energy system change.  
 
Addressing such cross-scalar dimensions, energy justice has emerged as a framework for 
analyzing and redesigning the social and material relations that constitute energy systems. 
Engaging core tenets of distributional, procedural, and recognition justice (Jenkins et al. 2014, 
2016), energy justice scholarship has expanded beyond a focus on fuel poverty and siting issues 
to also address questions of “cross-boundary impacts” of energy policies, activism, and ethics 
(McCauley et al. 2016). Such work has also addressed potential intergenerational inequalities 
that result from energy systems, and the risk of environmental damage impinging upon the 
ability of future generations to achieve their conception of the good life (Barry 1997, Schlosberg 
2007). Drawing on established theories of distributive justice (who experiences what risks, harms 
and benefits across society, as a result of what principles of distribution), procedural justice (who 
participates in decision-making processes), and cosmopolitan justice (that justice principles must 
apply globally), Sovacool et al. (2014) developed prohibitive/affirmative principles of justice 
that identify access to energy as a fundamental basis for material well-being, which itself is 
threatened by externalities and costs that result from energy systems. For people living without 
ready access to energy, this can be one among a number of urgent needs including healthcare, 
water, sustenance, shelter and employment (Islar et al. 2017). Work on energy justice as a 
decision-making framework has also addressed the need to establish policy-applicable 
mechanisms for energy availability, affordability, accountability, and sustainability (Sovacool et 
al. 2016).  
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The work of environmental justice activists and academics offers strategies for further refining 
energy justice approaches, including systematic interrogation of the racialized relations 
embedded in the creation and perpetuation of environmental inequalities (Bullard 1996, Pellow 
2000), and questioning the ‘why’ of inequity, rather than relying on philosophical or ideal 
schemes of justice in liberal societies, while also examining social histories that impede the 
functioning of those schemes (Young 1990, Fraser 2000, Schlosberg 2004, p. 519). Individual 
and community empowerment, both as a pivotal legal strategy and a foundation for grassroots 
political action (Cole and Foster 2001), has also been identified as a means for achieving 
comprehensive justice objectives (Schlosberg 2007). Such justice concerns are not easily 
addressed by urgent measures or short-term initiatives. An analytical focus on urgency thus 
responds to the need for a critical perspective on process and temporality in justice issues while 
also scrutinizing how decision-making undertaken in conditions of urgency may contribute to or 
work against empowerment and the realization of justice aims. 
 
2.2 Shale extraction, urgency, and climate change  
Shale development offers a particularly illustrative case through which to study the temporal 
dimensions of energy system change. Energy policy in the UK has been subject to political 
‘streamlining’ and the introduction of policy mechanisms specifically to expedite energy 
development, at times with the effects of diluting environmental protection (Cowell and Owens 
2006) and curtailing opportunities for participatory decision making (Groves et al. 2013). In 
particular, UK governmental support for ‘going all out for shale’ and stimulating shale 
development has, along with official Acts on Planning and Localism, led to fracking-related 
reform measures with the aim of streamlining planning and consent applications (Cotton 2017). 
In recent decades in the US, direct government investment in fracking-related technologies has 
helped facilitate a rapid and significant increase in domestic oil and gas production through a 
‘shale revolution’ involving many different states (Trembath et al. 2012, EIA 2015). In addition, 
in both countries, the development of shale resources has become central to policy and political 
rhetoric around issues often described as ‘urgent’ such as climate change and energy security 
(Phadke 2013). Shale development thus offers a critical site for exploring the discursive and 
ethical aspects of urgency and arguments for streamlining framed in terms of urgency.  
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Supporters of shale development promote shale gas as cleaner-burning than coal in electricity 
generation and suggest the expansion of fracking operations could help nations to reduce their 
CO2 emissions (HL-EAC 2014). Opponents of shale development, however, take a contrasting 
view on the relationship between US shale extraction and climate change mitigation (Broderick 
and Anderson 2012, Partridge et al. 2017, Thomas et al. 2017b). Continued global extraction of 
shale gas, for example, threatens to perpetuate existing patterns of energy use and generation 
(Westphal 2013), competing for investment and political support and potentially displacing or 
delaying the uptake of ‘zero-emission’ nuclear energy and renewables (Sovacool 2014). Some 
environmental groups in both the UK and US assert an urgent need to reduce global use of fossil 
fuels within current energy systems, and thus call for limiting or reversing the expansion of 
fracking (Broderick et al. 2011, Perry 2012, Willow and Wylie 2014). In both countries, current 
systems of governance for fracking have been linked to a number of justice implications due to 
procedural inequalities and democratic deficits (Cotton et al. 2014, Whitton et al. 2017).  
 
The promotion of shale gas as a low-emissions energy source highlights how perspectives on 
urgency in relation to climate change are varied and contested. These variations have been 
identified as a hurdle to adaptation and mitigation efforts because a sense of urgency and of 
responsibility have been found to be requisite conditions for action, in addition to risk awareness 
and institutional capacity (van den Berg 2011). A lack of perceived or explicit urgency on the 
part of the public is one of the most frequently cited impediments to desired amplification of 
climate change risk and related behavior change (Pidgeon and Fischhoff 2011). McCollum et al. 
argue that energy policy makers engage with three key objectives (one of which is climate 
change mitigation, as well as security of supply, and reduction in air pollution) according to the 
perceived urgency they attach to each, with energy security and pollution concerns frequently 
considered more urgent (McCollum et al. 2011). Climate change is thus an important but not 
exclusive energy-related issue where perceived urgency can lead to competing objectives and 
related justice claims being differentially addressed, prioritized, or overlooked. 
 
2.3 Urgency, institutions, and procedural justice 
A focus on urgency engages energy justice scholarship with work in the social sciences on 
temporality and (mis)alignment between societal assessment and technological development. In 
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policy studies, the notion of systematically slow or insufficient responses to risk on the part of 
decision-makers has been classified as policy underreaction (Maor 2014). Here, however, we 
draw on critiques across the social sciences that move beyond assessment of particular policy 
actions and judgments in order to analyse the broader social context, socioecological 
consequences and justice implications of policy decisions, particularly those related to energy 
development. Such critiques address governments and other powerful institutions and their 
handling of urgent issues – often seen as acting either (i) with insufficient urgency or failing to 
prepare for (or respond to) critical events with appropriate speed and commitment, or (ii) 
deliberately amplifying and intensifying claims of urgency to bring about acquiescence to certain 
proposals (Owen et al. 2013). The latter might be done strategically in order to circumvent 
regulation (especially environmental requirements); argue in favor of unpopular technologies 
(such as ‘fracking’); or to limit democratic participation (by silencing or devaluing concerns and 
opposition).  
 
Studies of organizational change have found that in the context of political decision-making, 
urgency can hinder long-term thinking in policy design and, when coupled with heightened fear, 
lead people to look for proximate rather than systemic causes for issues experienced in the 
present (Lianos 2015). MacKerron notes that urgent policy decisions have to be balanced against 
the need for legitimacy and consent, and overemphasizing urgency often disrupts the latter 
(MacKerron 2009). Issues in conflict scenarios considered in terms of risk, danger and urgency 
tend to provoke different policy responses to those couched in a discourse of rights and justice 
(Peters 2010). Considering these diverse contexts together, we see that urgency is diagnostic and 
entails ascribing relative degrees of value and importance to different elements of social life, 
which can result in institutional actors disregarding some concerns as ‘not mattering’ (Rosenberg 
et al. 2009). These are among the many justice implications that follow when different actors 
identify, reject or accept conditions of urgency and alter their actions accordingly.  
  
Developing this focus on urgency and combining energy justice with other social science 
approaches speaks directly to issues surrounding procedural justice, understood as meaningful 
participation within equitable and fair institutional processes and inclusive involvement in 
democratic or participatory decision-making procedures (Young 1990, Schlosberg 2007). 
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Scholars of public participation in technology and development governance highlight a need to 
replace urgency-based claims made by governments and other actors – claims made in support of 
the rapid unimpeded implementation of technology development – with approaches that are more 
socially responsible and responsive (Stilgoe 2013, Guston 2014). The argument here is that 
meaningful processes of deliberation and reflection require time to be completed and form an 
integrated, iterative component within innovation processes (Stilgoe 2013), and that public 
participation through deliberative fora is a core strategy for achieving these goals and thus 
working to achieve procedural justice (Parkhill et al. 2013). Building on previous successful 
deliberative research (Harthorn et al. 2012a), we held public deliberation workshops in the US 
and UK. 
 
 
3. Methods 
 
Our team designed and facilitated four daylong deliberation workshops to engage diverse publics 
on the meanings and consequences of future shale extraction. Workshops included a presentation 
on the technical processes involved in extracting oil and gas from shale rock using hydraulic 
fracturing and also informational materials that we designed in consultation with a panel of 
topical experts in both countries (Partridge et al. 2017). A total of 55 people participated in our 
workshops held in Los Angeles and Santa Barbara in the US, and in London and Cardiff in the 
UK. These sites were selected as comparable pairs of cities in each country (one major city 
population hub; one smaller, regional city) located in ‘pre-impact’ areas that have not yet seen 
extensive shale extraction via deep-drilled horizontal wells as seen in parts of the US where the 
shale industry is already established. Our US sites are pre-impact since well-stimulation 
techniques already in use in California occur primarily in established oilfields away from coastal 
regions and to date have been used to access oil reservoirs not located in shale (CCST 2015).  
 
The deliberative workshop format was based on several previous sets of workshops on other 
emergent technologies (Harthorn et al. 2012a, Corner et al. 2013, Parkhill et al. 2013). The 
deliberative research context, in contrast to survey-based processes and findings, constitutes a 
unique setting for examining both shifting and conflicting individual risk and benefit perceptions 
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(Macnaghten 2017) and the articulation of public attitudes about technology in society in 
dialogue with others from diverse backgrounds. We suggest that such deliberative contexts offer 
productive modes of inquiry for examining the different ways that urgency figures in or is absent 
from participants’ accounts of emergent technologies including ‘fracking,’ and how this relates 
to respondents’ subjectivity, sense of responsibility and ambivalence, and other ethical and 
societal concerns.  
 
Two factors in particular make shale development an atypical case for deliberation: variation in 
stages of development across the US and UK; and the existence of scientific and media accounts 
of already-witnessed impacts. Shale development is thus a ‘liminal’ case for deliberation, 
engaging both topics of discussion typically considered downstream or post-impact (such as 
localized issues of hazard and safety) and those associated with pre-impact or upstream locations 
(national-level concerns and questions of ethics) (Partridge et al. 2017, Thomas et al. 2017a).  
 
The protocol used across all sites – with minor adjustments made to provide locally relevant 
contextual information, e.g. matters of energy regulation and planning processes – followed a 
similar format to previous nanotechnology deliberative workshops (Pidgeon et al. 2009, 
Harthorn et al. 2012a). Workshops involved a series of tasks, facilitated discussions, information 
sharing and open-ended conversations designed to address key issues associated with shale 
development, and to enable participants and groups to discuss these issues in their own terms 
(Partridge et al. 2017). ‘Quasi-representative’ groups of people were recruited in each city 
aiming to match local demographics as closely as possible with regard to age, income, 
educational, occupational, and ethnicity, balanced gender, and drawn from different parts of the 
cities. Recruitment of participants took place through neutral third parties and was ‘topic blind’ – 
participants were invited to a workshop to discuss ‘technology and society.’ 
 
Full audio and video recordings of the workshops were made with participants’ consent. We 
hired professional transcription services to generate texts of all discussions that were then 
anonymized, coded and analyzed thematically: research team members systematically reviewed 
reflections and points of comparison in collaborative conversations between research sites. 
Subsequent rounds of reading and coding enabled us to explore key themes that emerged in the 
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data, including a wide range of concerns and ideas linked to risk and benefit perception, energy 
and society, inequality and governance. Here, we focus on diverse views on urgency and justice 
as they appear in discussions on shale oil and gas extraction and associated risk concerns. 
 
 
4. Results  
 
4.1 Energy supplies and drivers of urgency 
In all four workshops, participants acknowledged the importance of maintaining ready access to 
energy, noting both the urgency of – and governmental responsibility for – ensuring energy 
supplies are not disrupted. For Eric in Los Angeles, this was an issue of “national security” since 
“without energy, none of our systems work. Our traffic grinds to a halt. Airplanes start falling, 
crashing, or whatever” (Eric, LA). Some participants in the UK felt that the critical importance 
of maintaining energy supplies could motivate the early adoption of shale development. In 
London, Tony described governmental moves to extend the number and geographical range of 
Petroleum Exploration Development Licenses in the UK in terms of ‘time pressure’: “for those 
charged with making that decision… The time pressure is acute already… We’re behind the 
curve.” In the same workshop, Paul echoed this sentiment, suggesting that the UK delaying to 
scale up shale extraction meant that as a nation “we’re already late to the table on this. We’re 
late to the party.” During a discussion on the contested climate change implications of shale 
development, Tony again referred to a sense of time pressure driving energy policies, though this 
time also noting how short-term solutions can lead to greater overall costs in the long-term: “I 
think there is a real issue around energy security, which is coming. And if we delay too long, 
then the pressure to do short term things with even greater costs [is] likely to increase” (Tony, 
London).  
 
In Santa Barbara, Ron recognized that increased extraction of fossil fuels represented “a 
temporary solution to our energy needs” at a time when technologies associated with non-carbon 
based energy sources, such as hydrogen-based electricity generation, are still in developmental 
stages. However, he added that in the short-term this created a need to press ahead with shale 
development wherever it was viable, particularly as a result of competition on the international 
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stage: “in the meantime, we have to stay competitive with the rest of the world” (Ron, Santa 
Barbara). In the same workshop, Saul suggested that the presence of fossil fuels now made 
accessible and economically viable brought with it an obligation to use them, in order to promote 
domestic US oil and gas production: “are we going to, you know, tap into our own resources 
[like] Mexico is doing right now? …They’re starting to come up because they’re utilizing their 
oil industry and all the oil they have” (Saul, Santa Barbara). Ron concluded that the importance 
of energy supplies and maintaining a competitive lead meant that even polluting energy options 
should be pursued, despite the consequences and even if it requires sacrifice:  
“sometimes we have to think beyond our own personal interests and think [about] 
national security, our energy needs… [fracking] is going to have impacts. It’s going to 
[have] negative impacts. Even if I’m for it, I’ve got to realize there’s negative impacts to 
it, but sometimes we have to think beyond our own self-interests, our own little 
community and what’s of interest to the nation as a whole, because we have to compete 
in the world” (Ron, Santa Barbara). 
 
Energy security concerns were not the only way in which participants described time-related 
pressures acting on governments to expand shale extraction. Joe in Cardiff made two related 
points concerning contested energy timeframes and shale development, noting: (i) tensions 
between waiting to gather more evidence regarding the relative safety of shale extraction in 
Europe before scaling up production; (ii) added urgency or impetus in favor of shale 
development resulting from potential competition with other shale resource producing nations: 
 Joe:  “One, we already know what it’s like because they’ve been doing it in the 
States for ages. There’s no point watching to see what it’s like in Europe 
because it’s [the] same process. And two, if we do wait until the European 
countries do it, and then think, oh wait a second, we want to do it, we’re very 
far behind them.  
 Laurel: We’re going to miss out then.  
 Joe:  They will have cornered the shale gas markets and we’ll all just be playing 
catch up. So if it’s something which we do decide we want to do, then we want 
to get in on the ground floor or not do it at all.” 
 Partridge et al. (2018) 
12 
Such views highlight a potential driver of urgency: a preference for dealing with “known” 
hazards and dangers could justify adopting sub-optimal or destructive proposals in immediate or 
short-term timeframes. This exchange also draws attention to how a sense of competition – and 
concomitant need to act quickly in order to beat competitors – might drive both urgency in 
energy policy decision-making and add to public support for controversial measures such as 
shale development, a view we also encountered among a small number of participants in the US. 
 
4.2 Urgency, framing, and climate change 
Despite some acknowledgement of the above ‘drivers’ of urgency, the more widespread position 
articulated across our groups was concern that focusing on short-term objectives, especially 
those achieved through the rapid expansion of new technologies, may create greater costs 
overall. Participants in each of our research locations offered critiques of how the case for shale 
development has been made; a common theme was perceived short-termism (Partridge et al. 
2017). With reference to changes to energy systems, short-termism is reflected in energy policies 
that prioritize immediate interests over potentially harmful long-term impacts as when short-term 
profitability is valorized over the need to address hazards associated with increased air/water 
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions (Nixon 2011, Groves 2014). In Santa Barbara, Ray 
offered one such critique: 
 Ray:  “when I look at things like money and economy and jobs, those are low on my 
list.  
 Joel:  Yeah.  
 Ray:  So for me, I look at what it costs last. I look at the effects first, long-term 
effects. I’d rather pay more now, and solve a problem, than tell my 
grandchildren, ‘You have to take this problem because we didn’t want to deal 
with it. You solve it.’” 
 
Jess in Cardiff similarly felt that “quick fix” responses to urgent issues such as energy security 
were unsatisfactory, a point that met with some agreement, e.g.: “the environment [is] going to 
be hit detrimentally. So what’s the point of just having this short-term solution? [In] the long 
term we’re not going to get the gains, we’re going to be in a worse position” (Karen, Cardiff). 
Policies with apparently short-term objectives were seen as problematic both because they may 
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create immediate negative impacts and because they may fail to address underlying systemic 
issues – treating symptoms rather than causes:  
“the short term generally leads to more damage… in everything we see. So whenever 
something’s fixed short term, I can’t help but feel it’s just a patch on an already broken 
thing… The general problem is still there… [we] all understand that there’s climate 
change issues… So what’s our solution? It’s short-term fixes, and [it] leaves the main 
problem… [the] lack of focus is because we want to see results quickly” (Andrew, 
London).  
In a later discussion in the same workshop on whether resources that have been identified and are 
accessible should be used, similar issues emerged regarding the longer-term economic and 
environmental costs of prioritizing short term objectives: “[there’s] this need to have something 
now and not look at the long term” (Ellen, London). Nadia responded by highlighting the ‘false 
economy’ of urgently enacted measures: 
“if we looked, and politicians especially, if they looked at things in the long term 
properly… then they wouldn’t constantly need [all] these short term quick fixes, which 
need more money and more time and more expertise, which just constantly crop up… if 
you [plan] how you’re going to make things sustainable, renewable, environmentally 
friendly, as well as cost effective in the long run, then... you could save yourself time, 
money and effort” (Nadia, London). 
 
Another critique of urgency claims emerged in discussions on climate change: a widely-shared 
view was that shale development would exacerbate climate change both by contributing to the 
extraction and use of fossil fuels, and by proceeding at the opportunity cost of renewable 
technology research and investment, consequently narrowing the range of available energy 
alternatives and minimizing the impact of individual mitigation efforts (Partridge et al. 2017). 
Challenging arguments that promote shale gas as a lower-emissions energy source compared to 
coal, energy system changes to address climate change were identified as being both urgent and 
far-reaching. Thus, contrary to those who felt urgent needs such as energy security justified the 
implementation of sub-optimal measures in the short term, urgency-claims made in support of 
more polluting energy choices were disputed: “I’m not sure that I buy the arguments that… 
replacing coal emissions with gas emissions is actually going to solve the greenhouse gas 
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problem… wouldn’t it [be] much better [to] change to other technologies that are not producing 
greenhouse gases?” (Laurel, Cardiff). Laurel also drew attention to the urgency of reducing 
global greenhouse gas emissions: “if you add up the numbers, are we reducing coal enough, are 
we replacing enough coal with enough gas to actually have an impact by the time we need it?” 
Andrew in London made a similar point – that measures to reduce emissions were being 
implemented too slowly: “Lower emissions is great but it’s already too slow and it’s already 
passed the point where it’s something we should be thinking of.” 
 
Many participants articulated the need for more forward-looking, anticipatory policies, for 
example describing contemporary crises of environmental degradation and depletion of 
conventional oil reserves in terms of path dependence and over-consumption: “we’ve known this 
was coming since the first cars were rolling down the roads” (Miriam, Santa Barbara). In calling 
for anticipatory policy measures, participants questioned urgency-claims – including those that 
support shale development as a means to meet current and growing levels of energy demand – 
and rejected proposals seen as paying insufficient attention to longer-term outcomes. Such 
assessments of competing energy initiatives articulate moral choices about different energy 
futures and complex questions of ethics and (in)justice (Wynne 2005, Demski et al. 2015). 
Importantly, a number of participants suggested that desirable (in this case, renewable) energy 
initiatives should also be implemented with caution rather than urgency: 
“in an [ideal] world… I would say, renewables, they’re great… but it’s not going to 
happen quickly... [fossil fuels are] what we use, that’s what the infrastructure’s built for. 
We can’t just stop using it – we would have no energy… so I think [we] need to slowly 
rely on those less – slowly build up the others more… [they’re] pushing through shale 
gas really quickly. I don’t think the alternatives should be pushed through really quickly 
either, even if it’s something I agree with… I think nothing will work if we push it too 
quickly” (Lois, London). 
 
4.3 Urgency and inequality 
Issues of inequality also emerged in discussion of urgency claims. Most participants felt they 
would not have access to any projected economic benefits of increased oil and gas extraction. 
Explicit policy support for shale development in the UK was described as a “dash for cash” 
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where “people are being asked to [give] up land rights, [give] up existing rights for corporate 
profit” (Paul, London). Paul also made a point that people in the room agreed with – that the 
speed with which UK politicians were issuing extraction licenses was a concern, and that a 
slower pace of development with time to include more ‘independent’ assessments was required: 
“[it] feels like a rush to licensing, you know… there is some kind of a push for a very large 
number [of] companies to benefit. And that comes back to the cynicism and the concern. And 
perhaps just needing to see… a little bit of slamming on the brakes of that licensing, whilst they 
independently assess the viability” (Paul, London). In Los Angeles, the main beneficiaries of 
increased shale extraction were seen to be ‘private corporations’ and their shareholders – groups 
that most participants in that city felt they were excluded from (Thomas et al. 2017a). 
 
In these discussions, participants also drew attention to broader temporal concerns, particularly 
with reference to the uneven distribution of social and environmental impacts of shale extraction. 
Economic impacts were pitted against those that would lead to significant or irreversible changes 
(such as water contamination). Lois drew attention to such inequalities across different 
timescales and sectors of the wider population, indicating that a focus on immediate benefits was 
a “selfish view” if a proposal “will benefit us now but then screw the future generations, or other 
countries, or even people in my country now, but who aren’t me” (Lois, London). In the same 
conversation, such apparent disregard for potentially adverse effects on others who are distant 
temporally, geographically, or socially reflected historical patterns of exploitation – what was 
called “a very colonial way of thinking” (Andrew, London). The experience of many participants 
in Los Angeles stood out from the other three workshops: people in the room there felt much 
closer to the impacts. For example, Sally said that “the less fortunate” are “most likely going to 
suffer” and described prospective shale development as fitting an historical pattern of industrial 
developments affecting poor and marginalized communities most acutely. 
 
Concerns about how hastening or shortening energy decision-making processes might affect 
public participation were raised a number of times, particularly in the UK, along with potentially 
negative effects on efficacy within and exclusion from those processes: “what strikes me [with] 
fracking and with [the] way we gain our energy, is that the lay person or the normal constituent 
has no say in it really… these are massive decisions that affect all of us, especially our children. 
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We’re ruining [the] world for our children and we don’t get [a] say in it” (Bea, London). Joe in 
Cardiff similarly felt that “the politicians are just pushing ahead with it, regardless of what the 
public says,” while Paul in London acknowledged that public participation is often required by 
law for certain planning applications but may not have any significant effect because it happens 
too late in the development process when “the decision is already done.” Discussion on these 
contested timeframes around public participation also questioned urgency and highlighted the 
need for more anticipatory approaches: 
“They do these things before they are fully aware of the consequences… And then at the 
end, [you] get it hitting you back in the face… it’s the same with [any] new thing that 
comes up… we are the ones who are going to be suffering the consequences… so we 
should have more of a say in anything that goes on but we don’t, do we? We’re told 
afterwards and it’s all passed through under wraps and we’re told at a later date… I 
think we should be made more aware of what’s going on [and] have more input” 
(Heather, Cardiff). 
 
Another way in which urgency, or short-termism, might exacerbate rather than reduce 
inequalities emerged in relation to the issue of intergenerational justice, e.g., “I feel bad. I feel 
like we’re kind of screwing up collectively the world for the next generation of kids” (Joel, Santa 
Barbara); “I’m concerned about the environment, what we’re doing to our planet… there are 
certain things that you just have to do to survive. But at the same time, it’s very tormenting and 
very complicated… you think about your children. You wonder what their life is going to be like” 
(Kim, Santa Barbara); “we’re not just concerned about our wallet. We’re concerned for our kids 
and other generations” (Sally, Los Angeles). We also heard concerns that consuming finite 
supplies of fossil fuels both reflected poorly on humans’ collective abilities to care for planet 
Earth and even put human existence at risk in the longer term future: “we have not been very 
good stewards of how we use [our resources]” (Joyce, Santa Barbara); “does humanity only 
intend to survive for another thousand years?” (Bea, London). The speed with which fossil fuels 
are currently being used up was also highlighted as contributing to intergenerational inequality. 
In this sense, fossil fuels were seen as both polluting and precious – burning them inflicts 
environmental harm on others while the time taken for them to form is not reflected in the haste 
to find and consume more: 
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“we can’t take everything right now just because [it’s] what we need… It’s going to make 
us have no more air to breathe, which would be bad… this took millions of years to 
occur… and in 15, 25, 150 years we should just like take it all? And then what?” 
(Miriam, Santa Barbara). 
 
Taken together, these views reflect widespread rejection of actions and urgency claims that 
overlook marginalized populations or distant others. Such claims were also rejected when they 
were seen as perpetuating the unequal burdening of social and environmental costs from today’s 
energy practices – both as a threat to future generations and to those who are already enduring or 
are likely to endure the consequences of unconventional fossil fuel extraction.    
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
The diverse views that we have documented among participants in the United States and United 
Kingdom on urgency and prospective shale extraction reflect critical questions for energy justice. 
Our deliberative method was designed to recognize and respond to the complexities and abilities 
of individuals as acting subjects who test competing narratives against culturally established 
criteria of value, virtue and reasoning; grapple with ambivalence in responding to cognitive and 
social conflicts; and articulate moral choices about the purposes and future of technological 
developments (Jasanoff 2005). Such a design challenges the assumption that public concerns are 
limited to “instrumental consequences” rather than also crucially attentive to broader questions 
of ethics and value that are driving sciences and innovation (Wynne 2005). We might, then, 
expect the deliberative context to support discussion of justice concerns since it provides space 
for participants to explore in more detail issues that have been identified in other studies of 
attitudes toward emergent technologies such as fairness, equality and scrutiny of those who stand 
to benefit most (Satterfield et al. 2012). Still, our findings show that participants not only 
explored such questions in assessments of shale development and other energy initiatives but did 
so with reference to temporality and urgency, raising justice concerns across intersecting issues 
of distribution and the creation of environmental inequalities, process and procedure, 
recognition, and empowerment. 
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Participants in both countries recognized various energy-related issues as being urgent, including 
meeting energy demand, sustaining a competitive economy, reducing environmental pollution, 
and addressing climate change. At the same time, participants assessed governmental and 
institutional responses to these conditions of urgency with a critical eye. In some cases, this 
meant they saw governments as acting with insufficient urgency, as reflected in participant 
rejections of decisions that defer conservation or climate change mitigation efforts while 
maintaining the ‘energy status quo’ (Strauss et al. 2013). Conversely, participants also expressed 
concern about a perceived lack of precaution in the governance of shale development and other 
energy initiatives. Here, calls for more anticipatory approaches emerged out of widespread 
criticism of ‘quick fix’ solutions that address urgent energy-related issues but do so with 
apparently insufficient regard for their longer-term and justice-related implications (for example 
increased ecological damage or widening socio-environmental inequalities).  
 
We encountered widespread resistance to issue framings that make urgency-based claims in 
support of their objectives – particularly when people felt certain energy proposals were 
presented as unequivocally necessary or inevitable – that is, when people feel they are being 
presented with ‘energy imperatives.’ These findings parallel STS scholarship that argues a single 
technological application is rarely found to be uniquely necessary, and such imperatives may be 
constructed deliberately to negate consideration of alternative forms of development (Stirling 
2010). Relative levels of trust in governments and other powerful actors were also questioned in 
relation to the idea of ‘known’ hazards. Special interest groups can work to highlight disputed 
research results as inconclusive and misrepresent uncertainty in order to disrupt urgent public 
interest in regulation, as has been seen in relation to climate change through industry-funded 
research designed to ‘manufacture uncertainty’ to slow down or undermine the basis for 
regulatory intervention and to generate complacency among the public (Michaels 2008). 
Conversely, for individual risk perception, higher levels of uncertainty can lead to greater fear 
when people feel that they lack comprehensive information, or do not understand the information 
available, or if potential risks and outcomes are invisible (Slovic 2000). In our findings, concern 
for the justice implications of energy systems change were generally heightened when conditions 
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of urgency meant fewer opportunities to find out about, or be consulted on, new energy 
proposals. 
 
Regarding distributive and intergenerational justice, in all workshops (and across all age groups) 
we encountered concern for younger people and future generations facing the negative 
consequences of contemporary energy practices – articulated both in terms of environmental 
damage and resource scarcity, prompting reflection on how quickly fossil fuels are being 
consumed. Some participants in the US articulated these concerns with specific reference to 
anxiety or “torment” about “screwing up the world.” Building on the work of Parfit (1983), 
theorists have addressed the moral basis of acting differently now out of consideration for future 
generations, weighing opportunity costs, probability of harms and different generations’ ability 
to handle them, and considering ‘long-range effects’ of contemporary actions both spatially and 
temporally. As Groves points out, present and future people are not primarily related as 
consumers competing over “how to share a fixed set of resources”: thinking about “future-
oriented responsibilities” is characterized by uncertainty since determining how risks and 
resources are to be distributed fairly across generations requires knowledge that is simply not 
available (Groves 2014, p. 90). However, our participants had misgivings about excessive 
consumption of finite fossil fuels in the immediate timeframe even when faced with related 
uncertainties (e.g. the possibility of finding more fossil fuels or developing more efficient modes 
of use). At issue were both the already witnessed polluting effects of fossil fuel consumption and 
the inequitable time imbalance seen as disadvantaging future generations between ‘taking 
everything right now’ and the aeonic, geological timescales of fossil fuel formation. 
 
Around climate change, energy justice scholarship has engaged with calls from climate justice 
movements to scrutinize global wealth distribution, international governance structures, and the 
under-representation of historically marginalized populations (McCauley et al. 2016). That work 
also identifies how global distribution of impacts of climate change, vulnerabilities to those 
impacts, and the burden of climate change mitigation efforts is socially, spatially, and temporally 
uneven (Bickerstaff et al. 2013). As the above intergenerational justice concerns suggest, many 
of our participants acknowledged such global inequalities and critiqued institutional responses to 
them, both for acting with insufficient urgency and for supporting misguided or unconvincing 
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proposals (“lowering emissions is already too slow” [Andrew, London]). Such calls for urgent 
changes to energy systems to prioritize the well-being of future generations over short-term 
economic gain also raise justice concerns when the proximate understood more broadly (whether 
economically, socially, geographically, or temporally) is prioritized at the expense of the distant. 
Survey research on UK public perceptions of energy security and climate change has found 
levels of concern are higher when geographical, social and temporal dimensions of psychological 
distance are reduced, for example when risks are presented as immediate (Spence et al. 2012). 
However, across our pre-impact research sites, participants articulated a global outlook and 
typically adopted what has been described as a ‘cosmopolitan’ view on energy justice (Sovacool 
et al. 2014). This involved identifying how current energy practices impact negatively on people 
“who aren’t me” whether that difference is spatial, temporal or cultural.  
 
Risk research has found proximity to hazard combined with urgent perceived economic benefit 
or need can produce worker risk attenuation (Nelkin and Brown 1984, Harthorn 2003). Similarly, 
our participants discussed how justice implications of urgency and energy system change vary 
across and within different sectors of the population (marked by gender, race/ethnicity, and class, 
among other social locational positions). In Los Angeles, participants themselves felt “closer” to 
projected negative impacts – both geographically (negative polluting impacts seen as likely to 
directly affect their homes and communities) and temporally (any negative effects are expected 
to have an impact immediately). Also in Los Angeles, as well as in London, we encountered the 
view that those most likely to benefit from increased shale extraction would be corporations 
rather than members of the general public – inequalities in the distribution of benefits that have 
been documented on the ground in parts of the US where shale extraction is in operation at scale, 
and where even residents located close to shale gas wells may not receive significant income 
benefits (Clough and Bell 2016). 
 
In our discussions on proximity and inequality, participants described the urgency of injustice 
itself. Energy justice was seen as less a function of better design and closer adherence to ideal 
principles to create more just energy systems in the future. Rather, participant views reflected 
literature and activism associated with movements for global justice and climate justice, 
articulating an immediate need to identify extant systemic injustices and to address the 
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“interlocking systems of inequality” that produce them (Pellow 2000). Such views also reflect 
calls within energy justice scholarship to address specific social, spatial and environmental 
justice conflicts within broader efforts to achieve equity and sustainability (Jenkins et al. 2014, 
Meng 2018). The views documented above suggest that many of the already-witnessed harms 
associated with contemporary energy practices would likely be exacerbated as a result of 
increased oil and gas extraction from shale. As emphasized in the London workshop, any energy 
initiatives proposed or implemented under conditions of urgency were at risk of repeating past 
mistakes and being blind to their long-term implications: ‘nothing will work if we push it too 
quickly.’ 
 
In both countries, when public engagement was discussed, people felt there should be more, and 
more meaningful, opportunities for citizens to have ‘their say.’ However, expectations in Los 
Angeles that city residents themselves were likely to experience hardships as a result of 
expanded shale extraction point to differences across our workshops in views on distributive, 
procedural and recognition justice, both between cities (this view was more widespread in Los 
Angeles than in Santa Barbara, echoing different social histories of exposure to risk and feelings 
of vulnerability) and between countries. The US and UK have different national histories of 
deliberation and public engagement (Jasanoff 2005, Pidgeon et al. 2009). Reflecting this, we 
found subtle differences in the claims participants made. In the UK, more people spoke out 
directly about how public participation could be improved: that public voices should have input 
into policy-making decisions at an earlier stage and that consultation processes should pay more 
attention to calls for precaution. In the US, the emphasis was slightly different: we heard more 
about how the interests of corporations and wealthy people (shareholders) were particularly 
influential in decision-making processes, and also about the need for citizens to be ‘better 
informed’ and the difficulty of finding reliable or ‘unbiased’ information.  
 
Such differences between the two countries also reflect different empowerment needs (for more 
education and participation opportunities in the US, and for more efficacy within extant 
participation processes in the UK) and acute awareness in our US workshops of how socio-
economic inequalities affect procedural and recognition justice: the undue influence and over-
representation of privileged voices and also barriers to participation faced by those currently 
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enduring and most likely to endure the ill effects of increased fossil fuel extraction. There are 
parallels here to divergence in national policy and approaches to technology governance between 
product-based risk assessments in the US and process-based, more precautionary measures in the 
UK and EU countries (Jasanoff 2005). Precautionary approaches to technology and development 
governance argue that, in case of doubt, judgment should support environment protection and 
human health, with direct implications for which technological initiatives are pursued or 
abandoned (Stirling 2007). Participants in our UK workshops demonstrated more familiarity 
with these approaches than US participants, as well as greater awareness of procedural rights for 
public participation in science and energy policy decision-making. 
 
In both countries, participants were skeptical about institutional appeals to urgency in support of 
particular forms of energy and technological development. As science and society scholars have 
noted, such appeals on the part of policymakers, technology developers, and industry work 
directly or indirectly to minimize the role of reflection and response to public values in decision-
making on the speed and direction of technological development (Macnaghten and Chilvers 
2014). Claims made with reference to urgency are thus in tension with approaches that engage 
social values and are equipped to assess both the consequences and aims of technology (Stilgoe 
2013, Guston 2014). Against such urgency claims, and in support of more precautionary 
approaches, participants in both the UK and US called for tempering of urgency appeals seeking 
more time for authorities and scientists to investigate the consequences of new energy initiatives 
and more opportunity to have their voices heard in policy decision processes. Contrary to survey 
research findings that identified a stronger general sense of technological optimism in the United 
States than the United Kingdom and Europe (Gaskell et al. 2005), here we see that similar 
concerns about urgency claims made by government and industry emerged with definition in 
both countries. 
 
A critical task for energy justice work – in addition to identifying procedural injustices, the need 
for improved access to reliable information, and better processes of establishing consent and 
meaningful consultation for energy projects (Sovacool et al. 2014) – is to assess and engage 
strategies for achieving these objectives. Research in STS, risk, and Responsible Innovation have 
called for participation that is ‘upstream’ (before projects are underway thus enabling alternative 
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development strategies to be developed) as well as deliberative, responsive, and anticipatory 
(able to effectively hear and respond to public ideas before any crises emerge) (Wilsdon and 
Willis 2004, Pidgeon et al. 2009, Owen et al. 2013). The analytical and practical quest here is 
mutually reinforcing, bringing together tested strategies of upstream participation for improving 
procedural justice, and utilizing insights from energy justice work and elsewhere that highlights 
the importance of recognition justice while also, ideally, tackling how and why unequal barriers 
to participation exist within societies. Participation concerns, particularly in the UK, drew 
attention to current consultation processes happening ‘too late’ and not having decision-making 
influence. More generally, as we have seen, urgency tends to reinforce the status quo, effectively 
perpetuating extant social barriers and exacerbating rather than reducing socio-economic 
inequalities. Conditions and claims of urgency around energy projects can thus be further 
analyzed by assessing the impact of such claims on procedural and recognition justice. 
 
Rather than urgency claims serving to attenuate potential concerns about issues of safety or 
ethics in this case, such claims for most of our participants instead led to increased suspicion or 
amplified concern that energy initiatives might be implemented before their impacts were fully 
understood. At the same time, however, in considering energy proposals, a number of 
participants acknowledged that urgent political or economic needs might constitute a reasonable 
trade-off against potential negative social or environmental impacts. While our study is limited to 
exploring views on shale development, energy transitions, and their contexts in the United States 
and United Kingdom, based on our analyses of urgency in energy justice and building on our 
own research on societal implications of energy and emergent technologies (Pidgeon et al. 2009), 
we encourage examination across disciplines of urgency as a concept. This would include 
investigating how claims of urgency both implicit and explicit, and their reception or opposition, 
vary across social and geographical locations; identifying instances of urgency being expressed, 
promoted or resisted; and a systematic investigation of links between urgency and risk 
perception, particularly when short-term concerns, needs and views are in tension (both socially 
and individually) with longer-term concerns.  
 
Contested energy timeframes present critical questions for energy research, particularly with 
respect to issues of justice, inequality, and scrutiny of whose needs and priorities urgency claims 
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are seen as addressing and representing. We argue that a focus on urgency provides fresh 
perspectives on justice concerns surrounding the speed and direction of technological 
development in general and of energy transitions in particular. The hope here is to expand the 
role of energy research in developing insights into new links between contested temporality, 
energy transition, risk perception, and public engagement with science and technology and 
energy decision-making. 
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